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The Anti-Discrimination Paradox: How Federal Civil
Rights Laws Afford Broader Protection from
Discrimination Than the Constitutional
Provisions that Authorize Them
Professor Henry Rose
Loyola University Chicago School of Law
INTRODUCTION
On April 22, 1980, the United States Supreme Court issued two decisions
that present the anti-discrimination paradox. Both cases involved the rights of
black citizens in southern municipalities to be free from racial discrimination
that interferes with their right to vote. However, in these decisions the Su-
preme Court announced two very different legal standards to determine
whether actionable racial discrimination had occurred.
In City ofMobile, Ala. v. Bolden, black citizens of Mobile, Alabama filed
suit alleging that the at-large election of the city's three commissioners unfairly
diluted the voting strength of the black citizens of Mobile in violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment.' No black person had ever been elected a city commis-
sioner in Mobile, even though blacks constituted approximately one-third of
the electorate. 2 A majority of the Supreme Court held that the Fifteenth
Amendment prohibits only the purposeful denial of voting rights on account
of race, color or previous condition of servitude.3
In City of Rome v. U.S., the Supreme Court considered whether Rome,
Georgia's annexation of 13 geographic areas with predominantly white popula-
tions unfairly diluted the voting strength of the black citizens of Rome in
violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).' The VRA provision at
issue in the case explicitly prohibited changes in voting practices that have the
effect of abridging or denying the right to vote on the base of race.' Rome
argued that Congress lacked the authority under the Fifteenth Amendment,
which authorized the VRA, to prohibit voting practices that had the effect of
disadvantaging black voters if they were not motivated by racially discrimina-
I City ofMobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980).
2 Id. at 122-23.
3 Id. at 65, 103.
4 City of Rome v. U.S., 446 U.S. 156, 159 (1980).
5 Id. at 172.
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tory intent.6 A majority of the Supreme Court rejected Rome's argument and
upheld Congress' enforcement authority under Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment to prohibit in the VRA electoral changes that are racially discrimi-
natory in effect even if Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits only
intentional discrimination.' The majority reasoned that since electoral changes
by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimina-
tion in voting create a risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper for
Congress to ban electoral changes that have a discriminatory impact in an
effort to prevent these jurisdictions from violating the voting rights of blacks in
the future.'
These two cases present the anti-discrimination paradox: Certain federal
civil rights statutes allow proof of discrimination based on disparate-impact,
even though violations of the constitutional provisions that authorize these
statutes also require proof of discriminatory intent.9 The purpose of this article
is to examine this paradox and explore how the United States Supreme Court
has addressed it. The anti-discrimination paradox is rooted in earlier voting
rights cases addressing the constitutional issues raised by state literacy tests for
voters.
STATE LITERACY TEST CASES
Under a North Carolina statute enacted in 1957, a person who sought to
register to vote there must "be able to read and write any section of the Consti-
tution of North Carolina in the English language".'o Louise Lassiter, a black
citizen of North Carolina, sought to register to vote but refused to submit to
the literacy test that the statute required and, as a result, her registration was
denied." Ms. Lassiter appealed the denial of her voter registration arguing that
the requirement of a literacy test violated her rights under the Fourteenth,
6 Id. at 173.
7 Id. at 177-78.
8 Id.
9 Within five years of the end of the Civil War, The Constitution of the United States of
America was amended to add the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Each of
the Amendments provided that Congress had the power to enforce them by appropriate legisla-
tion. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, § 2; XIV, § 5; and XV, § 2. Congress enacted various civil
rights laws pursuant to these enforcement powers.
10 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-28 (1957) (amended by 1957 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 287 § 1). This
statute tracked a provision of §4 of Article VI of the North Carolina Constitution that provided:
"Every person presenting himself for registration shall be able to read and write any section of
the Constitution in the English language".
I1 Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 45-46 (1959).
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Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Amendments of the Constitution and her appeal
reached the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court unanimously
rejected Ms. Lassiter's constitutional challenge to the literacy test requirement
in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, finding that states have
the authority to determine qualifications for voting as long as those qualifica-
tions are not employed to perpetuate racial discrimination.1 2 The Court fur-
ther found that North Carolina's literacy test "has some relation to standards
designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot"1 3 and did not discriminate
on the basis of race because it applies to members of all races' and is designed
to raise the standards for people of all races who cast the ballot."' 5 In Ms.
Lassiter's case, the Supreme Court unambiguously recognized the right of
states to adopt literacy tests as a qualification for voter registration as long as
they do not discriminate against prospective voters on the basis of race.
In response to difficulties that blacks had in registering to vote, especially
in southern states, the Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965
(VRA)." Section 4 (a) of the VRA temporarily suspended the use of literacy
tests in the voting registration process in several southern states that Congress
determined had a history of denying voting rights on the basis of race." One
of these states, South Carolina, sued to challenge the constitutionality of vari-
ous provisions of the VRA, including the suspension of its literacy test."' South
Carolina's principal contention was that the provisions of the VRA at issue in
the case exceeded the power of Congress and encroached on state power in
violation of the federal Constitution. ' With regard to its literacy test, South
Carolina pointed out that literacy tests had been found constitutional in
Lassiter.2 0 The Supreme Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach initially noted
that Congress' authority to enact the VRA "must be judged with reference to
the historical experience which it reflects". 2 1 To the Court, the legislative re-
cord of the VRA showed that the literacy tests used in the applicable southern
states, including South Carolina, had been instituted with the purpose of dis-
12 Id. at 50-53.
13 Id. at 51.
14 Id. at 53.
15 Id. at 54.
16 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq., 79 Stat. 437.
'7 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 319, 329-30 (1966).
i8 Id. at 307.
19 Id. at 323.
20 Id. at 333.
21 Id. at 308.
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enfranchising blacks, thereby violating the Fifteenth Amendment.22 Since
Congress has full remedial powers under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment to "effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination
23in voting", the suspension of the literacy tests in South Carolina and other
southern states was held to be a valid exercise of Congress' power to undo the
effects of past discrimination.2 4
Included in the VRA was Section 4(e), which provided that a person who
had successfully completed the sixth grade in Puerto Rico could not be denied
the right to vote in any federal, state or local election because of the inability to
read or write English.2 5At the time of the enactment of the VRA, both the
New York Constitution and the New York Election Law provided that no per-
son shall be entitled to vote in New York unless the person is able to read and
write English. 26 As a result of these provisions in New York's laws, thousands
of Puerto Rican immigrants who were American citizens and resided in New
York were denied the right to vote there.2 7 Section 4 (e) of the VRA created an
obvious conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Lassiter, which held that
States had the authority under the Constitution to impose literacy standards as
a qualification for voting as long as literacy tests did not discriminate on the
basis of race.
The Supreme Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, a lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of section 4(e) of the VRA as it applied to New York, initially
noted that Section 4 (e) of the VRA was enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.28 New York
argued that Congress could only prohibit its state literacy test pursuant to its
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment if the literacy test
itself violated Equal Protection and the Supreme Court in Lassiter had found
state literacy tests did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 9 The Supreme
Court rejected New York's argument, finding Lassiter inapposite and interpret-
ing Section 5 authority to include "the same broad powers expressed in the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Art I, Section 8, cl. 18".s Applying the classic
22 Id. at 333-334.
23 Id. at 325-26.
24 Id. at 333-34.
25 Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e).
26 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 644 n. 2 (1966).
27 Id. at 644-45.
28 Id. at 643-47, 652.
29 Id. at 648-49.
30 Id. at 648-650.
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formulation of the reach of these powers enunciated in McCulloch v. Maryland,
the Court viewed the key questions to be: (1) Whether Section 4 (e) is "plainly
adopted" to the enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause and (2) whether
Section 4 (e) is not prohibited by but is consistent with the letter and spirit of
the Constitution.3 '
The Court found Section 4 (e) to be plainly adopted to the aims of Equal
Protection because its clear purpose was to ensure members of the Puerto Ri-
can minority nondiscriminatory treatment by government both in their partic-
ipation in voting and in their receipt of other important governmental
services. 32 With regard to whether Section 4(e) is consistent with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution, the Court recognized that Section 4 (e) did not apply
to all Puerto Rican immigrants but that Congress' determination to limit the
application of Section 4(e) indicated that Congress was acting incrementally to
only attack the most acute aspect of the problem that it sought to address."
The Court concluded that Section 4(e) of the VRA was appropriate legislation
to enforce Equal Protection and, therefore, protecting the right to vote of some
citizens of Puerto Rican descent who do not speak or write English was a valid
exercise of Congress' enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 34
CITY OF BOERNE V FLORES TEST
In 1990, the Supreme Court held in Employment Div., Dept. of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith that a neutral, generally applicable criminal law
may constitutionally prohibit a religious practice even when the law is not
supported by a compelling government interest.33 Smith ruled that earlier pre-
cedent in Sherbert v. Verner 6 (holding that governmental actions that substan-
tially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest) did not apply to a neutral, generally applicable criminal
31 Id. at 650-51.
32 Id. at 652-53.
33 Id. at 656-58.
34 Id. at 658. In 1970, Congress amended the VRA to suspend literary tests in all federal,
state and local elections for a period of five years. Pub L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314. Arizona chal-
lenged Congress' authority to suspend all literacy tests, but all justices agreed that Congress, in
the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, can prohibit
literacy tests used to discriminate against voters because of their race. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 118, 132 (1970).
35 Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85
(1990).
36 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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law. 7 In response to Smith, Congress overwhelmingly enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993" (RFRA), which expressly sought to restore
Sherbert's compelling government interest test in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened by government action.
Congress' constitutional authority to enact RFRA was challenged in City
of Boerne v. Flores.40 In City of Boerne, the Archbishop of San Antonio, Texas
applied for a building permit to enlarge a Catholic church in Boerne and the
city denied the permit on the grounds that the church was an historic build-
ing.4" The Archbishop sued the city, contending that the denial of the building
permit violated RFRA.4 2
The issue of Congress' authority to enact RFRA reached the Supreme
Court in City of Boerne and the Court concluded that RFRA exceeded Con-
gress' power. 3 The Court recognized that the free exercise of religion is pro-
tected from state action under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 4 Therefore, the specific issue in the case was whether Congress
had authority to enact RFRA under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.45 Under Section 5, Congress can seek to enforce free exercise of religion
rights that are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 Congress can
also rely on its Section 5 authority to prevent or remedy violations of rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.4 7 However, the Court ruled that
when Congress exercises its Section 5 enforcement authority: "There must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or reme-
died and the means adopted to that end."" The Court determined that RFRA
was neither remedial nor preventive legislation but instead sought a substantive
change in constitutional protections." The Court concluded that it is the Ju-
37 494 U.S. at 884-85.
38 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.
39 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b).
40 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
41 Id. at 512.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 511.
44 Id. at 517-19.
45 Id. at 516-17.
46 Id. at 519.
47 Id. at 518-19.
48 Id. at 519-20.
49 Id. at 532.
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dicial Branch's duty to interpret the Constitution and "say what the law is,"
and RFRA was unconstitutional in that it violated separation of powers.50
The only subsequent Supreme Court decisions that have applied the City
ofBoerne test for interpreting Congress' enforcement power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment have been in the context of state challenges to
Congress' efforts to abrogate States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit
in federal court.51 The Supreme Court has not applied the City ofBoerne stan-
dards for assessing Congress' enforcement power in subsequent Supreme Court
decisions that have involved the anti-discrimination paradox.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
In Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964,52 Congress prohibited em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.53 Initially, Title VII only applied to private employers engaged in com-
merce but 1972 amendments extended its coverage to government employers
as well.54 The application of Title VII to state and local governments was au-
thorized by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 5
In 1971, the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Company held that a
private employer that imposed neutral job qualifications that were not related
to job performance violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 if these
qualifications disproportionately excluded black job applicants.5 ' The Title VII
violation occurs even if the employer did not intend for these job qualifications
to disadvantage black applicants.57 However, the Court in Griggs did not ad-
dress the source of Congress' constitutional authority to enact Title VII or to
authorize statutory violations of it based on evidence of discriminatory effects
alone.5 8
In 1976, the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis held that in order for
employment discrimination against blacks to violate Equal Protection, a gov-
50 Id. at 536.
5' Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 310, 314-15 (5th ed.
2015).
52 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
53 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2(a).
54 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2(b).
55 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447 (1976).
56 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
57 Id. at 432.
58 Title VII was amended in 1991 to explicitly allow disparate-impact claims of employment
discrimination. 105 Stat. 1071, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
65
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ernment employer must act with racially discriminatory purpose.59 The Court
rejected the black plaintiffs' arguments that employment discrimination, under
Equal Protection, could be proved by the same racially differential impact stan-
dard adopted by the Court in Griggs.60
The combination of Griggs and Davis presents the anti-discrimination par-
adox: Congress' authority to prohibit racial discrimination in employment by
state and local government employers under Title VII emanates from Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment; yet a Title VII violation against a government
employer can be based on a discriminatory effects theory of liability even
though employment discrimination by a government employer under Equal
Protection also requires proof of discriminatory intent. Unlike in the voting
rights cases, the Supreme Court has not addressed the source of Congress'
authority to provide a discriminatory effects standard of liability under Title
VII against state and local government employers when the Equal Protection
standard of liability requires proof of intentional racial discrimination by gov-
ernment employers.
When Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA)," it only applied to private employers. In 1974, Congress
amended the ADEA to cover states and their political subdivisions as employ-
ers.62 In E.EO.C v. Wyoming, the Supreme Court upheld the 1974 amend-
ment applying the ADEA to state and local government employers as
authorized by Congress' power under the Commerce Clause but declined to
decide whether this amendment to the ADEA was also authorized by Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 3
In Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, the Supreme Court addressed
whether the ADEA allows age discrimination in employment claims based on a
theory of disparate-impact.6 ' The Court found that the ADEA's provision
prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of age was identical to
a provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 except for the substitu-
tion of the word "age" for Title VII's prohibition of employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex or national origin."6 5 The Court
recognized that the Supreme's Court decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Com-
59 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 427, 431 (1971).
60 Id. at 238-39.
61 81 Star. 603, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
62 88 Stat. 74, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
63 FE O.C v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983).
64 Smith v. City ofJackson, Mississippi, 544 U.S. 228, 230 (2005).
65 Id. at 233.
66
8
Public Interest Law Reporter, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 11
https://lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/11
No. 1 * Fall 2016
pany,66 interpreting the nearly identical Title VII text, "strongly suggested"
that a disparate-impact theory should be cognizable under the ADEA.6 7 In
addition, the Court recognized that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the federal agency charged with implementing the ADEA, had
consistently interpreted the ADEA to authorize relief on a disparate-impact
theory.6 8 For these reasons, the Court concluded that the disparate-impact the-
ory of liability is available under ADEA. 69
Smith v. City ofJackson, Mississippi is interesting for the dog did not bark.
The Supreme Court's decision in Smith made no mention of City ofBoerne. At
first blush, this omission makes sense because City ofBoerne interpreted Con-
gress' authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment7 o and the Su-
preme Court in EEO. C v. Wyoming found that the application of the ADEA
to state and local government employees was a valid exercise of Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause, declining to decide whether it was also
authorized under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.71 However, in Ki-
mel v. Florida Board ofRegents, the Supreme Court had previously applied the
City ofBoerne test to the ADEA, holding that Congress lacked authority under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the ADEA. 72 In applying the City of Boerne test in
Kimel, the Court found that since age classifications are scrutinized under
Equal Protection with rational basis review, the ADEA prohibits substantially
more state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held to
violate Equal Protection.7 3 In addition, the Court found that Congress had
failed to develop a legislative record identifying a widespread pattern of age
discrimination by the States.7 ' Accordingly, the Court held in Kimel that the
ADEA did not satisfy City of Boerne's "congruence and proportionality" test
and that the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity was not validly abrogated
in the ADEA under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 5
66 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
67 Smith, 544 U.S. at 236-37.
68 Id. at 239-40.
69 Id. at 240.
70 521 U.S. 507, 516-517 (1997).
71 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983).
72 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
73 Id. at 86.
74 Id. at 90-91.
75 Id. at 67, 82-83, 91.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Kimel suggests that the ADEA's dispa-
rate-impact standard for establishing age discrimination by states and local
units of government might not satisfy City of Boerne's test of congruence and
proportionality for the proper exercise of Congress' authority under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The disparate-impact standard would likely
prohibit many more employment decisions and practices of states and local
units of governrient than would be found to violate the Equal Protection ra-
tional basis test. In addition, the Court in Kimel found that the legislative
record compiled by Congress for the ADEA "reveals that Congress had virtu-
ally no reason to believe that state and local governments were unconstitution-
ally discriminating against their employers on the basis of age". 76
On the other hand, in upholding a disparate-impact standard for establish-
ing employment discrimination in Griggs v. Duke Power Company and Smith v.
City ofJackson, Mississippi, the Supreme Court implicitly upheld such a stan-
dard when Congress prohibits employment discrimination through its Com-
merce Clause power. In both Griggs and Smith, the Supreme Court interpreted
the statutory language of Title VII and the ADEA to allow disparate-impact
claims of employment discrimination against employers. Although the Su-
preme Court has not directly addressed the issue, Griggs and Smith suggest that
disparate-impact standards of proving employment discrimination are author-
ized under Congress' Commerce Clause power.
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
In 1968, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act (FHA)7 1 which prohibits
housing discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status,
handicap or national origin.7 9 The Supreme Court has not addressed Con-
gress' constitutional authority to enact the FHA. However, in the same year
that the FIA was enacted, the Supreme Court held in Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer
Co. that Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress to enact
76 Id. at 91.
77 The Supreme Court has broadly applied the Commerce Clause power in upholding Con-
gress' authority to enact civil rights laws. In Heart ofAtlanta Mote Inc. v. United States, the
Court upheld Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on Commerce Clause grounds, applying a
rational basis test to Congress' enactment. 379 U.S. 241, 258-59 (1964). In Katzenbach v.
McClung, the Court, upholding the application of Title II to a family-owned restaurant, de-
scribed Congress' Commerce Clause power in this area as "broad and sweeping". 379 U.S. 294,
305(1964).
78 82 Star. 81, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
79 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
68
10
Public Interest Law Reporter, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 11
https://lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/11
No. 1 * Fall 2016
42 U.S.C. 1982, which prohibits all racial discrimination in the sale and rental
of property.so There is little doubt that the Section 2 of Thirteenth Amend-
ment would also authorize Congress' enactment of the FHA's prohibitions
against racial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing."
The Supreme Court has not decided whether a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment or 42 U.S.C. 1982 requires proof of discriminatory intent. How-
ever, the Supreme Court did hold in Village ofArlington Heights v. Metro Hous-
ing Development that to prove racial discrimination by a governmental entity in
a housing decision under Equal Protection, there must be proof of racially
discriminatory intent.82
In Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc., the Supreme Court held that disparate-impact
claims are allowed under the FHA." The Court found that the statutory lan-
guage of the FHA," the FHA's legislative history,8 5 and the consistency of the
disparate-impact theory of liability with the central purpose of the FHA86 sup-
port this holding.
Since the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutional source of
Congress' authority to enact the FHA, the anti-discrimination paradox is not
fully established with regard to housing discrimination. If the Supreme Court
were to hold that Congress' power to enforce Equal Protection under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment authorized the FHA's disparate-impact theory
of liability, the anti-discrimination paradox would be presented. A claim of
housing discrimination by a government entity that violates Equal Protection
would require proof of discriminatory intent while housing discrimination
claims against government entities under FHA would only require proof of
disparate-impact.
80 Jones v. Alfed H. Meyer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413, 439 (1968).
81 Congress' authority to prohibit housing discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, famil-
ial status, handicap or national origin would likely be upheld under the Commerce Clause. See
Heart ofAtlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
82 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Development, 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
83 Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,
135 S.Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015).
84 Id. at 2518-19.
85 Id. at 2520.
86 Id. at 2521.
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SUMMARY
Section 2 of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment grant Congress the power to enforce the substan-
tive provisions of each Amendment. The anti-discrimination paradox involves
the extent to which Congress' civil rights statutes enacted pursuant to these
enforcement powers can allow proof of discrimination based on a disparate-
impact theory of liability when proof of violations of the constitutional provi-
sions that the statutes seek to enforce also require proof of discriminatory
intent.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach described Congress' power under Section 2
of the Fifteenth Amendment as "remedial"8 7 and held that Congress could
suspend literacy tests for voting in states where they had been used to violate
rights created in Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment in an effort to undo
the effects of past discrimination. Thus, Congress' enforcement power under
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment encompasses the power to provide rem-
edies for violations of the voting rights created in Section 1 of the Fifteenth
Amendment.
Katzenbach v. Morgan addressed whether Congress' power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce Equal Protection could be used to
provide voting rights to citizens of Puerto Rican descent who could not vote
under New York law due to their inability to read and write English. The
Supreme Court held that Congress' enforcement power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment encompasses the same broad powers that Congress
has under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution." The Su-
preme Court concluded that this grant of Congressional power allowed Con-
gress to require New York to allow some Puerto Rican immigrant citizens to
vote even if they could not read or write English.9 0
In City ofRome v. United States, the Supreme Court identified a preventive
dimension to Congress' enforcement powers under Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment. The Court in City of Rome upheld a discriminatory effects test
for determining violations of the VRA in order to prevent the risk of pur-
posefu discrimination in the future by southern jurisdictions with a history of
denying blacks the right to vote.
87 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325-26 (1966).
88 Id. at 333-34.
89 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-650 (1966).
90 Id at 658.
91 City of Rome v. US., 446 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1980).
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In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court announced a new test for
reviewing Congressional legislation enacted pursuant to its enforcement power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recognized that
this enforcement power could be used to prevent or remedy violations of the
substantive constitutional rights that they seek to enforce.92 The Court also
acknowledged that Congress can enact statutes, pursuant to this enforcement
power, that prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional under the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 3 Nevertheless, the
Court held that when Congress exercises this enforcement power there must be
congruence and proportionality between the constitutional injury sought to be
prevented or remedied and the legislative means Congress has adopted. 94 The
congruent and proportionality test announced in City ofBoerne arguably limits
the broad grant of Congress' enforcement power under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment that was announced in Morgan.
The City ofBoerne test was not applied in subsequent Supreme Court cases
addressing whether Congress could validly adopt disparate-impact standards
for establishing age discrimination in employment violations under the ADEA
(Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi) and housing discrimination under the
FHA (Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc.). In neither case was it clear that the ADEA or the
FHA were enacted pursuant to Congress' enforcement power under Section 5
of the 14th Amendment. Had the Supreme Court found that either the ADEA
or the FHA was enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
the Supreme Court arguably could have applied the City of Boerne test to de-
termine whether Congress validly exercised this power. In both cases, the Su-
preme Court upheld the disparate-impact standard for establishing actionable
discrimination based on the Court's interpretation of the legislative intent of
the ADEA and FHA. Another series of Supreme Court cases suggest that dis-
parate-impact liability standards in federal civil rights laws would also be inde-
pendently authorized under Congress' Commerce Clause authority.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress can enact civil rights statutes
that create disparate-impact theories of liability for proving discrimination
even when the substantive constitutional provisions that the statutes seek to
enforce also require proof of discriminatory intent. This anti-discrimination
92 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1997).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 520.
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paradox indicates that the Constitution grants Congress broad enforcement
authority to enact laws that seek to prevent or remedy violations of our Consti-
tutional provisions that seek to guarantee equality under law.
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